Tantalo & Adler LLP 9300 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 550 Beverly Hills, CA 90212	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	TANTALO & ADLER LLP Michael S. Adler (SBN: 190119) email: madler@ta-llp.com Joel M. Tantalo (SBN: 206096) email: jtantalo@ta-llp.com 9300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 550 Beverly Hills, California 90212 Telephone: (310) 734-8695 Facsimile: (310) 734-8696  Attorneys for Defendant LYNNE SPEARS	OF THI	John A. ( ByS	FILED Angeles Superior Court  JUN 15 2009  Clarke, Executive Officer/Clerk HAUNYA-WESLEY  ORNIA		
	9	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES					
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		CAMILITE		CASE NO - BC 404	5004		
	11	SAM LUTFI,	{	CASE NO.: BC 406			
	12	Plaintiff,	}	Assigned for all purporting The Honorable Zaver			
	13	vs.  LYNNE IRENE SPEARS, JAMES PARN SPEARS, BRITNEY JEAN SPEARS, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive.	}	DEFENDANT LYNNE SPEARS' NOTIC			
	14		) STRIKE PURSUANT TO ANTI-SLAPP				
	15		) STATUTE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ) & AUTHORITIES & SUPPORTING				
	16	Defendants.	}	DECLARATIONS ( AND CHIP MACG)	OF LYNNE SPEARS ERGOR		
	17		}	[Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425	5.16]		
	18		)	Request for Judicial I	Notice filed concurrently		
	19		}	herewith; [Proposed] herewith	Order lodged concurrently	1	
	20		}	Hearing Date:	July 14, 2009		
	21		}	Hearing Time: Hearing Place:	8:30 a.m. Dept. 23		
	22		}	Complaint Filed:	Feb. 3, 2009 March 4, 2010, William House, Spirit House, S	######################################	
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LYNNE SPEARS' ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE

### TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 14, 2009, at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department 23 of the above-entitled Court, located at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, defendant Lynne Irene Spears ("Lynne") will and hereby does move this Court, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, for an Order striking the First, Second, and Fourth causes of action of plaintiff's First Amended Complaint asserted against Lynne and the related demands for damages and other relief, dismissing plaintiff's action against Lynne with prejudice, and entering judgment in Lynne's favor.

This Motion is made on the ground that plaintiff's complaint is a meritless "SLAPP" lawsuit arising out of the exercise of Lynne's constitutionally-protected freedom of speech. Each of plaintiff's three (3) purported causes of action against Lynne falls within the ambit of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) because the causes of action (i) arise out of written statements made by Lynne in a public forum and/or Lynne's exercise of her right of free speech, and (ii) concern an issue of public interest. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3),(4). Plaintiff's First, Second, and Fourth causes of action against Lynne must be stricken, and the entire action against Lynne therefore dismissed with prejudice, because plaintiff either has not pleaded a legally-cognizable claim and/or cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits of each required element of any of his claims against Lynne. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1). This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points & Authorities, the attached Declarations of Lynne Spears and Chip MacGregor, the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice, the complete files and records in this action, and such further evidence and argument as may be presented prior to or at hearing on this matter.

DATED: June 15, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,

TANTALO & APLEA LLP

By:

Michael S. Adler

Attorneys for defendant LYNNE SPEARS

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This case arises from the high volume of publicity generated by plaintiff's involvement in and subsequent judicially-ordered exclusion from - the life of pop star Britney Spears ("Britney"). Plaintiff Sam Lutfi ("Lutfi") was an associate of Britney Spears before Britney's well-publicized conservatorship. In February of 2008, this Court's Probate Department handling Britney's conservatorship issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Lutfi from communicating with Britney in any way or approaching within 250 yards of Britney, her children, her parents, or their respective homes (the "TRO").

The TRO was based in large part on a declaration from Britney's mother, Defendant Lynne Irene Spears ("Lynne"), filed in the conservatorship action. Lynne's declaration recounted various facts about Lutfi's relationship with Britney, including: (a) Lutfi's claim that he had ground up prescription drugs such as Risperdol and Seroquel and put them in Britney's food; (b) Lutfi's claim that he had disposed of all of Britney's cell phone chargers and made her house phones unworkable; and (c) Lutfi's request that Lynne tell Britney that her then-boyfriend was gay.

On February 5, 2008, Lynne's declaration became public and the statements in the declaration were widely reported throughout the United States. The Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Boston Globe, and the New York Post (among many, many newspapers) reported on these statements, as did countless magazines (such as People) and national television programs (such as coverage on MSNBC and CNN). Articles about the declaration - and the declaration itself appeared on myriad internet sites such as the ABC News website, the CBS News website, TMZ.com, the People Magazine website and so forth. There cannot be any question but that tens of millions (if not hundreds of millions) of people learned about these facts in February of 2008.

More than six months later, Lynne's memoir was published. Through the Storm recounts Lynne's life as a middle-class, small-town mom whose family got caught up in the tomado of fame when her two young daughters became international celebrities. As part of her life story, Through the Storm recounts (often word for word) the same facts to which Lynne testified in the TRO declaration, and which previously had received such world-wide coverage. The book did not sell particularly well, perhaps because there was little news in the book.

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In this action, Lutfi claims that he has been defamed by Lynne. Recognizing that he cannot sue Lynne or the court for the world-wide publicity he received in February of 2008 in connection with the TRO because judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. Lutfi styles his complaint as if his damage comes from the publication of the same facts in Lynne's later-published memoir. Lutfi asserts that he has been the subject of ridicule in magazine headlines, television shows, and internet gossip sites, and he contends that the publication of Lynne's memoir in the fall of 2008 is the proximate cause of such ridicule. Notably, however, the only specific facts from Lynne's memoir that Lutfi has identified as being allegedly defamatory are those contained in Lynne's declaration filed in this Court and widely-reported in connection with the February 2008 TRO. The evidence will show that the book could not have been the cause of any harm to Lutfi, and that his reputation was already widely established well in advance of the book.

California's anti-SLAPP statute protects the exercise of an individual's constitutional right to freedom of speech. To apply, California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 first requires that the defendant establish that a claim arises from a defendant's protected activity. Here, there is no question that Lutfi's claim are based on Lynne's exercise of her free speech rights (i.e. publication) and that the memoir addressed an issue of interest to the public. As such, the claims arise from a protected activity. Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi Kertula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008) (holding that anti-SLAPP applies to magazine article on any issue in which the public is interested, even "tabloid" issues.) Once the defendant meets the burden of showing the claims arise from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a probability of success on his claims at this early, pleading stage. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. To do so, Lutfi must show that he has pled a legally sufficient claim and produce admissible evidence sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. Nygard, 159 Cal.App.4th at 1044 (2008). In other words, to defeat this motion Lutfi must introduce admissible evidence on each element of each of his claims against Lynn sufficient to establish a prima facie case on each cause of action.

Lutfi has brought three purported causes of action against Lynne: one for "defamation," one for "libel," and one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lutfi's "defamation" claim is based on various characterizations of Lutfi as a "fake," a "Svengali," "a predator," "a gatekeeper,"

and "the General." [First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 37.] These characterizations are mere statements of opinion, and as such are protected speech as a matter of law and therefore not actionable. *Nygard*, 159 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 1048-49. Lutfi's "defamation" claim fails as a matter of law and is therefore legally insufficient within the meaning of the statute. Lutfi's second cause of action must be struck.

Lutfi's separate "libel" claim is based on six specific statements about Lutfi, each of which first was published in Lynne's original, widely-reported declaration and only repeated later in her memoir. As an initial matter, Lutfi will bear the burden of proving that each element of a libel claim, starting with proof that each statement was false. Lynne already has testified under oath that those statements were true. In addition, if his causes of action are to survive this motion to strike, Lutfi also must show that it was the publication of the statements in the book that allegedly caused him his supposed harm, given the overall context in which those statements were made. In light of the massive world-wide publicity that arose out of Britney's conservatorship and the TRO in February of 2008, Lutfi cannot demonstrate any probability that the mere repetition of those same statements just six months later, in a relatively unsuccessful book, caused him any additional harm.

Finally, Lutfi's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress merely incorporates his prior allegations against Lynne for "defamation" and "libel." Since the defamation claim cannot stand as a matter of law, and since the libel claim must fall under the evidence, this claim also must be struck. As a result, all three of Lutfi's claims against Lynne should be stricken, in their entirety and judgment should be entered in Lynne's favor.

#### II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In considering a motion to strike under Section 425.16, the Court considers the pleadings, the evidentiary submissions from both sides, and matters subject to judicial notice. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.

A. ON FEBRUARY 1, 2008, THE PROBATE DEPARTMENT OF THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PLAINTIFF OSMA ("SAM") LUTFI.

On February 1, 2008, the Probate Department of this Court placed Britney Spears under a temporary conservatorship in the case In re the Conservatorship of the Person of Britney Jean

Spears, matter number BP 108870. [Lynne Spears' Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Fact 1 and Ex. 1.] In connection therewith, the Probate Department issued a temporary restraining order against Osama ("Sam") Lutfi on the same date. [RJN Fact 2 and Ex.2.] In the several months leading up to the conservatorship, Lutfi had been involved with much of Britney's public and private life. [RJN Fact 4 and Ex. 4; January 31, 2008 Declaration of Lynne Spears ("Spears Dec.") ¶ 16 (describing Lutfi's desire to be publicly photographed with Britney).] The TRO restrained Lutfi from directly or indirectly attempting to contact Britney Spears. *Id.* The TRO likewise required Lutfi to stay at least 250 yards away from Britney as well as the homes of Britney, her children, her siblings, and her parents. *Id.* 

### B. LYNNE'S DECLARATION FILED WITH THE COURT IN SUPPORT OF THE TRO IDENTIFIED THE SAME FACTS ABOUT WHICH LUTFI NOW COMPLAINS.

As part of the TRO application on behalf of her daughter, the Probate Department of this Court considered a six page declaration from Lynne based on her observations of Lutfi. [RJN Fact 3 and Ex. 3.] In particular, Lynne's declaration attested to the following facts:

- (a) "Sam [Lutfi] told [Lynne's friend] and me that he grinds up Britney's pills, which were on the counter and included Risperdol and Seroquel. He told us that he puts them in her food that that was the reason she had been quiet for the last three days (she had been sleeping.) He told us that the doctor who is treating her now is trying to get her into a sleep-induced coma so that they could then give her drugs to heal her brain."
- (b) "Although Britney has several cell phones, he told us that he had disposed of all of the phone chargers and had made the house phones unworkable."
- (c) "Sam then said to tell Britney that Adnan [her then-boyfriend] was gay."
- (d) "Adnan has called me and told me he's worried about Britney. He told me that Sam hides the phones and tells her he has lost them. He also hides her dog, London. She looks for him all over the house crying and then Sam brings out the dog from the hiding place and acts like her savior."
- (e) "I understood from the conversation that Sam had disabled all of Britney's cars (she has several at her residence)."

[RJN Fact 3 and Ex. 3 at Paragraphs 13, 9, 10, 24 and 4.]

C. THE CONTENTS OF LYNNE'S DECLARATION WERE REPORTED TO TENS OF MILLIONS (IF NOT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS) OF PEOPLE MONTHS BEFORE LYNNE'S BOOK WAS PUBLISHED, AND US WEEKLY EVEN REPORTED THAT LUTFI HAD ADMITTED GIVING BRITNEY DRUGS.

On February 5, 2008, Lynne's declaration became public. [RJN Fact 5 and Ex. 5.] The

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statements in the declaration were widely reported around the country (and the globe). [Id.] Among countless other news and tabloid outlets, the facts identified above were reported in The Los Angeles Times, the New York Daily News, the New York Post, Newsday, the Boston Globe, the Chicago Sun Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the Seattle Times, as well as in popular news magazines such as People. [Id.] The facts set forth in Lynne's declaration were also widely reported on television. including MSNBC and CNN's "Showbiz Tonight" segment. [Id.] Finally, of course, the facts were reported on a multitude of news sites on the internet. [RJN Fact 6 and Ex. 6.]

Lynne's declaration itself was also widely available on the internet, being posted in full on news sites like ABCnews.com and the popular websites TMZ.com and TheSmokingGun.com, among numerous other places. [RJN Fact 7 and Ex. 7.]

Moreover, as part of the massive wave of publicity about these facts, US Weekly even reported that Lutfi had admitted giving Britney drugs. [RJN Fact 8 and Ex. 8.]

#### ABOUT SIX MONTHS LATER, LYNNE'S BOOK WAS PUBLISHED WITH LIMITED SUCCESS, REFERENCING THE SAME FACTS OF WHICH LUTFI NOW COMPLAINS.

Lynne's memoir, Through the Storm, was released to the public on or about September 16. 2008, more than six months after Lynne's declaration became public. Declaration of Chip MacGregor ("MacGregor Dec.") ¶ 4.] Lynne's publishers printed over one hundred and sixty five thousand copies of the book with the hopes that it would sell more. [Id. ¶¶ 6-7 and Ex. 1.] Unfortunately, the book was not a great success. [Id.] As of March 31, 2009, the book had sold approximately 65,000 copies; only slightly more than a third of the total number of printed copies. [Id.]

As part of her life story in the book, Lynne recounted the same information that she had included in the declaration. In particular, Lynne reported that:

- "Sam told [Lynne's friend] and me that he grinds up Britney's pills, which (a) were on the counter and included Risperdol and Seroquel, and puts them in her food. He said that was the reason she had been quiet for the last three days. She had been drugged and asleep. He said that her doctor was trying to get her into a sleep-induced coma so that they could then give her other drugs to treat her."
- "[Lutfi] told us that he threw away all of Britney's phone chargers and (b) disabled the house phones by cutting the wires."

- (c) "He then told us to tell Britney that Adnan is gay."
- (d) "Adnan told me that Sam also would hide Britney's dog, London. She would look all over the house, crying, and then Sam would bring out the dog and act like some sort of savior."
- (e) "Adnan told me that Sam hid Britney's cell phones and told her that he lost them."
- (f) "[Lutfi] also disabled several of Britney's cars so she couldn't leave unattended."

[Through the Storm, pages 176-77, attached to Plaintiff's FAC, and FAC ¶¶ 27-29.]

In addition, Lynne recounted – among other things – that Lutfi had said directly to her: "'If you try to get rid of me, she'll be dead and I'll piss on her grave." [Through the Storm, Page 176-77, attached to Plaintiff's FAC.]

# E. LUTFI SUES LYNNE, ALLEGING THAT HE HAS BEEN LIBELED AND DEFAMED BY THE BOOK EVEN THOUGH THOSE SAME FACTS HAD BEEN WIDELY PUBLISHED MONTHS EARLIER.

In the FAC, Lutfi alleges that the first six facts identified above from the book are false and libelous and that he has been harmed as a result of the publication of those facts in the book. [FAC ¶¶ 27-34.] Lutfi also alleges that he has been defamed by the book and its reference to him as a "fake," a "Svengali," "a predator," "a gatekeeper" and "the General." [Id. ¶¶ 37-40.] Finally, Lutfi alleges that Lynne's actions in allegedly libeling and defaming him constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Id. ¶ 53.]

Lutfi asserts that the book has received significant amount of media attention on public television and internet sites. [FAC ¶ 33, 43.] Lutfi likewise asserts that "since the publication of the Book," he has allegedly been "subjected to unfathomable amounts of ridicule and public scorn. Lutfi is constantly bombarded by magazine headlines, television shows, and internet gossip sites that have propagated Lynne's [alleged] lies and fabrications. Lutfi can no longer find work as a counselor of at-risk teens. Lutfi has received numerous death threats from overzealous fans and, as such, is no longer able to venture into the public without being harassed and ridiculed." [FAC ¶ 30, 40.] Lutfi thus attempts to blame his poor reputation on the book without mention of the extensive national publicity that pre-dated the book by more than six months.

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#### III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is California's anti-SLAPP law, enacted to protect defendants from inappropriate lawsuits arising out of a defendant's acts "in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech." Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). Section 425.16 requires that a plaintiff's claims subject to the anti-SLAPP statute be stricken, "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Id. The anti-SLAPP statute thus provides a mechanism to screen out harassing lawsuits at an early stage. Kilber v. Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., 39 Cal.4th 192, 196-97 (2006); Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 273 (2001).

Evaluation of an anti-SLAPP motion requires a two-step process. Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi Kertula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1035 (2008). First, the court must determine "whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one "arising from" protected activity." Id. (quoting City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 76 (2002)). Then, if the court finds that the cause of action arises from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish both a legally sufficient complaint and a showing of facts sufficient to sustain a judgment. Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc., 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 951 (2007); Equilon Enterps., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (2002). In considering the pleadings and the evidentiary submission of both the plaintiff and the defendant, the court will not weigh the credibility of competing evidence, but the Court must grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(2); Plumley v. Mockett, 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1047 (2008). If plaintiff fails to meet his burden, the Court must dismiss the action. Beilenson v. Sup. Ct., 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 953 (1996).

#### LUTFI'S CLAIMS ARISE OUT OF FIRST AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITY, TRIGGERING THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE'S PROTECTIONS.

Under California's anti-SLAPP statute, "protected activity" is any act in furtherance of a person's right of free speech under ether the United States or California Constitution, in connection with any issue of public interest. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) and (e). For purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, "protected activity" includes "written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in a Beverly Hills, CA 90212

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place open to the public or in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." Nygard. 159 Cal.App.4th at 1035 (quoting Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(3) (emphasis added). "Protected activity" also includes any other conduct in furtherance of an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4).

1. Lynne's Memoir Constitutes a "Public Forum" Within the Meaning of the Anti-SLAPP Statute, And Regardless Lynne's Memoir Was an Exercise of Her Free Speech Rights.

Publication of a book of general interest qualifies as a public forum for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. As the Court of Appeals observed last year in Nygard, the courts are required to broadly construe the concept of "public forum." Nygard, 159 Cal.App.4th at 1038; see generally Civ. Proc. Code \$425.16(a) ("This section shall be construed broadly."); Equilon Enterps., 29 Cal.4th at 59-60 (recognizing legislative mandate to construe anti-SLAPP protections broadly). Nygard expressly held that newspapers and magazines are public forums because they "can be purchased and read by members of the public." Id. at 1039; see also Barrett v. Rosenthal. 40 Cal.4th 33, 41 n.4 (2006); Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 895 (2004) (postings on websites are a "public forum" for anti-SLAPP purposes.).

It naturally follows that just as magazines and newspapers are public forums, so too are books of general interest which can be "purchased and read by members of the public." See generally Nygard, 159 Cal.App.4th at 1039; see also Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 (2004) (explaining that a publication is within the protections of anti-SLAPP statute if discusses public issues and is distributed to a large and interested community); Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 238 (1999) (magazine within protections of anti-SLAPP); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc. 15 Cal.App.4th536, 544-46 (1993) (documentary entitled to protection under anti-SLAPP); M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 629 (2001) (same).

At any rate, even if the publication of the book did not qualify as a "public forum" within the meaning of subsection (e)(3) (and it does), the publication of the book certainly is an exercise of the right of free speech under the United States and California Constitutions pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of subsection (e)(4). See generally Taus v. Luftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 713 (2007) (finding that

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there was "no question" that publication of articles was activity in furtherance of defendant's exercise of free speech.) Indeed, the right of publication of written materials is one of the fundamental rights protected by the right of free speech. See e.g. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61, 66-67 (1963) (rejecting opinions on books from state commission on morality as violating free speech rights); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (holding that motion pictures, like books, magazines, and newspapers, are protected by First Amendment).

#### Lynn's Memoir Addresses Issues Of Public Concern.

Finally, there can be no reasonable dispute that Lynn's memoir – and the statements in it with which Lutfi takes issue – address issues of public interest within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. As the Court of Appeals held last year in Nygard, an "issue of public interest" is "any issue in which the public is interested." Nygard, 159 Cal.App.4th at 1042 (emphasis in the original). Nygard went on to explain that "the issue need not be 'significant' to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute – it is enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest." Id. As evidenced by the widespread news coverage, it is abundantly clear that the Lutfi's conduct vis-à-vis Britney is an issue in which the public took a keen interest.

The anti-SLAPP statute clearly applies to Lutfi's claims against Lynne. Accordingly, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute the burden now shifts to <u>Lutfi</u> to establish that his claims are legally cognizable and supported by sufficient evidence to support a judgment.

### B. LUTFI CANNOT ESTABLISH A *PRIMA FACIE* CASE AS TO ANY OF HIS CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST LYNNE.

#### Lutfi's "Defamation" Claim Fails As A Matter of Law Because Statements of Opinion Are Protected and Not Actionable.

Lutfi's second purported cause of action for "defamation" alleges that Lynne's book contains various characterizations of him that are "pejorative," in referring to Lutfi as a "fake," a "Svengali," "a predator," "a gatekeeper," and "the General." [FAC ¶ 37.] Lutfi likewise contends that "Lynne accuses [him] of using paparazzi as his 'foot soldiers' and 'henchmen." [FAC ¶38.] Finally, Lutfi alleges generically that Lynne "indirectly accuses [him] of conduct that is despicable, dishonest, improper, immoral and potentially criminal" but provides no specific details. [FAC ¶39.]

It is well-established that there are "recognized constitutional limits on the type of speech

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which may be the subject of state [law] defamation actions." Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 260, 279 (2001) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990)). In particular, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is First Amendment protection for any statement that does not recite an actual specific fact about an individual, as opposed to mere opinion. Id. Opinions are protected and privileged, and not actionable. Id.

As a result, to establish a claim for common law defamation, a plaintiff must identify specific facts which are provably false. Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 27 (2007) (citing Milkovich, 497 at 20). Put differently, 'rhetorical hyperbole,' 'vigorous epithet[s],' 'lusty and imaginative expression[s] of . . . contempt,' and language used 'in a loose figurative sense' have all been accorded constitutional protection'" and are not actionable. Id. Where there are no verifiable facts, the statement is "clearly protected" under the First Amendment even if it reflects a statement of anger or disgust. Moyer v. Amador Valley J. Union High School Dist., 255 Cal.App.3d 720, 725-26 (1990). Likewise, characterizations of a plaintiff are not actionable, however emphatic or descriptive. Id.; see also Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1443-44 (2007); Miller v. Bakerfield News-Bulletin, Inc., 44 Cal.App.3d 899, 902-03 (1975).

There are absolutely no allegations, whatsoever, of any false statements of specific fact included in Lutfi's second purported cause of action for defamation. All of the statements that Lutfi has identified as allegedly "defamatory" in the second cause of action are statements of opinion by Lynne, and therefore protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Nygard, 159 Cal.App.4th at 1052; Morrow, 149 Cal.App.4th at 1444. Lutfi's second purported cause of action for "defamation" therefore must be struck from the FAC.

# 2. Lutfi Cannot Establish A Probability Of Success On His "Libel" Claim Because He Cannot Carry His Burden Of Proof.

Under California law, a cause of action for libel requires a statement of fact that is (a) intentional, (b) false, and (c) unprivileged. Cal. Civ. Code § 45. Moreover, Lutfi became voluntarily and publically involved with Britney Spears before the publication of this book, and therefore Lutfi is at least a limited purpose (or "vortex") public figure for purposes of his defamation and libel claims. Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1163 (2004); see generally RJN Facts 4-8 and Exs. 4-8. As such, Lutfi bears the burden of proof of faisity of the statements in this

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action as well as being required to prove malice on the part of Lynne. *Philadelphia Newspapers*, *Inc. v. Hepps*, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986) *Christian Research Institute v. Alnor*, 148 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 71, 81 (2007). Moreover, as such a public figure, Lutfi is subject to a heightened burden of proof: he must prove falsity by clear and convincing evidence. *Annette F.*, 119 Cal. App.4<sup>th</sup> at 1166; *Gilbert v. Sykes*, 147 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 13, 26 (2007). The heightened standard of proof does not apply only at trial; when faced with an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff who will bear a burden of clear and convincing evidence at trial must not only submit evidence tending to establish the truth of the matter, but sufficient to establish it to the clear and convincing requirement. *Christian Research Institute*, 148 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 84.

As an initial matter, Lynne testified to the truth of the six statements at issue less than three days after the statements were made. [January 31, 2008 Declaration of Lynne Spears ("Spears Dec.") ¶¶ 4, 9, 10, 13, 24.] Notably, Lutfi's complaint is not verified, and the evidence will show that Lynne's statements were in fact true. A plaintiff cannot sue for libel about statements that are true. Gilbert, 147 Cal.App.4th at 28. Because Lutfi must prove the falsity of the statements as a threshold matter and because Lynne's statements were true, Lutfi's "libel" claim must be stricken.

In addition, however, Lutfi's claim must also fail because the evidence shows that he was not harmed by Lynne's statements in the book. First, of course, it is a matter of black-letter law that Lutfi cannot claim harm for Lynne's statements in her January 31, 2008 declaration to the probate department of this Court that resulted in the TRO. Even if the statements were not true (and they are), the litigation privilege provides that statements made in a court proceeding are absolutely privileged. Civ. Code § 47(b); Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 40 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 948, 955 (2007) (Litigation privilege is "absolute and applies regardless of [alleged] malice."). Moreover, the subsequent

The Fourth District Court of Appeals disagreed with the holdings of Annette F. and Gilbert in Christian Research Institute on whether the plaintiff need prove falsity with clear and convincing evidence. Christian Research Institute, 148 Cal.App.4th at 81. Nevertheless, the result in that case was the same inasmuch as Christian Research Institute noted that the plaintiff had to demonstrate evidence to prove malice by clear and convincing evidence and found the plaintiff did not. Id., 86-87; see generally Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal.App.3d 924, 934 (1982) (actual malice never presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence). The same result will apply in this case whether the question is of falsity or malice: either way, Lutfi cannot demonstrate at all, much less by clear and convincing evidence, that Lynne made intentionally false statements since she obviously believed in the truth of a statement she made under oath.

publication by the news media of such statements made in court likewise cannot give rise to a claim. Civ. Code §§ 47(b),(d); *Paterno v. Superior Court*, 163 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1342, 1354 (2008) (reports of statements from judicial proceedings themselves are absolutely privileged.)

As such, the question is whether Lutfi has been harmed by the publication of Lynne's statements in the book, even if those statements were false (and they were not). Lutfi argues that Lynne's statements are "libel per se" and presumably therefore asserts that he does not have to plead and prove specific economic damages. See generally Civil Code §§ 45a, 48a. Lutfi can be expected to argue that general damage to his reputation is typically presumed in the case of "libel per se," even without affirmative evidence of damage to his reputation. Allard v. Church of Scientology, 58 Cal.App.3d 439, 450 (1976) (noting that damages may be presumed as a matter of law when claims are "libelous per se").

However, even if Lynne's statements constitute "libel per se," as a matter of United States Supreme Court law, Lutfi would be required to prove actual damages and could not rely on any presumption of harm because the matter involved an issue of public interest. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, in this instance, the Court may take judicial notice of evidence that should overcome any presumption because it affirmatively demonstrates that Lynne's statements did nothing to change Lutfi's standing in the public eye. In other words, Lutfi was "libel-proof" as to the statements about which he complains;

The "libel-proof" doctrine applies where a plaintiff's reputation with respect to a specific subject is already so badly tarnished that he cannot be further injured by specific statements on that subject. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1986). While no published state court decision in California has specifically addressed the "libel-proof" doctrine, <sup>3</sup> Guccione was generally cited with approval in Hughes v. Hughes, 122 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 931, 938 (2004). Moreover, the United States District Court for the Central District of California, applying California

The Gertz rule clearly applies when there is no proof of malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. Gertz did not reach the question of whether harm could be presumed if a plaintiff can prove malice. Id. Aside from Hughes, supra, it appears that the only other reported case in California to even mention the "libel-proof" concept was Aronson v. Kinsella, 58 Cal. App. 4th 254, 272 (1997). In Aronson, the Court of Appeals did not reach the "libel-proof" doctrine because it found for the defendant on other grounds.

law, concluded that the "libel-proof" doctrine applies under California law. Wynberg v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 564 F.Supp. 924, 928-29 (1982).

As the Second Circuit explained in Guccione:

The libel-proof doctrine is to be applied with caution, since so few plaintiffs will have so bad a reputation that they are not entitled to obtain redress for defamatory statements, even if their damages cannot be quantified and they receive only nominal damages. But in those instances where an allegedly libelous statement cannot realistically cause impairment of reputation because the person's reputation is already so low or because the true portions of a statement have such damaging effects, even nominal damages are not to be awarded. Instead, the claim should be dismissed so that the costs of defendant against the claim of libel, which can themselves impair vigorous freedom of expression, will be avoided.

Guccione, 800 F.2d at 303.

The federal court in Wynberg addressed a situation in which the National Enquirer had published an article that the plaintiff believed accused him of financially exploiting his relationship with actress Elizabeth Taylor. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. at 927. The court noted that there had been "numerous articles" in advance of the National Enquirer article that established that the plaintiff had "established a specific reputation for taking financial advantage of Elizabeth Taylor." Id. at 928-29. As such, the court found that there could not have been any harm to plaintiff as a result of the National Enquirer article and granted summary judgment on the libel claim. Id.

The case here is obviously parallel to that in Wynberg. To the extent that any individual cared about Lutfi's relationship with Britney Spears, the public was already well aware of the statements reflected in Lynne's TRO declaration and any effect on Lutfi's reputation had already occurred. Indeed, given the US Weekly article stating that Lutfi had admitted giving Britney drugs, Lutfi had clearly already "established a specific reputation" beyond the declaration for the most extreme of the facts at issue herein before the book was published. As such, the evidence conclusively rebuts any inference that the later publication of the book could have caused Lutfi any cognizable harm, whatsoever. Absent damages, the claim should be dismissed. Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 (2009) (granting anti-SLAPP motion against defamation claim for failure to show damages).

In short, Lutfi cannot establish the falsity of the statements with the requisite evidence

required, and even if he could, he has clearly suffered no harm from the book. Lutfi cannot meet his burden with respect to the first purported cause of action for "libel," and therefore it must be stricken from the FAC.

### C. LUTFI'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ALSO FAILS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE FAILURE OF HIS OTHER CLAIMS.

The constitutional protections of the anti-SLAPP statute apply not only to defamation claims but to "all claims whose gravamen is the allegedly injurious falsehood of a statement." Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 13, 34 (2007) (quoting Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1042 (1986)). As such, the anti-SLAPP statute applies to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for a claim arising out of an allegedly injurious false statement. Id. This shifts the burden to Lutfi to establish both a legally sufficient complaint and a showing of facts sufficient to sustain a judgment. Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc., 150 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 941, 951 (2007).

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of significant emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc., 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 129 (2002) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979)). To be outrageous, the conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. at 130 (quoting Cervantez, 24 Cal.3d at 593.) The fact that conduct might constitute another tort is not alone enough to qualify the conduct as "outrageous." Cantu v. Resolution Trust Co., 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 888 n.14 (1992) (citing the Restatement 2d Torts, § 46, com. d, p. 73). In addition, the fact that conduct might be termed "outrageous" is not sufficient; instead, the tort requires conduct of a nature that is especially calculated to cause mental distress of a serious kind. Ess, 97 Cal.App.4th at 130.

In the context of this case, even if Lutfi might otherwise be able to establish the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (and he cannot), he cannot do so independent of the defamation claim. The collapse of the defamation claim will also "spell the demise" of all other claims which allegedly arise from the same publication. Gilbert, 147 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 34. Put differently, Lutfi cannot advance by means of an independent emotional infliction of intentional

Tantalo & Adler LLP 9300 Wilshire Blvd. Saite 550 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 distress a claim that fails as a defamation claim. *Id.*, quoting *Fellows v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc.*, 42 Cal.3d 234, 245 (1986); see also Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 682-83 (1983) (rejecting any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress "based on the very same acts which were insufficient to support a cause of action for defamation").

#### IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the reasons discussed above, this Court should strike each of Lutfi's first, second, and fourth purported causes of action against Lynne Spears pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 and grant judgment for Lynne.

Dated: June 15, 2009

TANTALO & ADLER LLP

Michael S. Adler Attorneys for Defendant

LYNNÉ SPEARS

#### **DECLARATION OF LYNNE SPEARS**

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### I, LYNNE SPEARS, declare:

- 1. I am the mother of Britney Spears ("Britney"), who is the subject of this action. I have personal knowledge of each of the facts set forth in this Declaration, and can testify competently thereto, except as to the matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true.
- 2. This past Monday night (January 28), Britney's father, Jamie, and I (in separate cars) went to Britney's house in Beverly Hills because we had heard news reports that Britney had just been in a big fight with Osama Lufti aka Sam Lufti ("Sam"), the man who has inserted himself into my daughter's life, home, and finances, and that she was crying. We were very concerned about her safety. We arrived at the Summit Community gatehouse in BHPO at approximately 10 p.m. I was with my friend, Jackje.
- 3. The guards at the gatehouse stopped us there for awhile. Jackie, Jamie, and I finally proceeded to Britney's house and entered it. We were able to enter the house because it was not locked. Britney does not lock her doors and currently there are no security guards around her residence. Britney was not home. We found Sam, and Sam said as we walked in the door that Britney only wanted me to come to the house, and that she was afraid to see her dad.
- 4. Two or three paparazzi came into the house and entered the kitchen. They greeted Sam. The paparazzi then reported to Sam where Britney currently was. From the conversation between Sam and the paparazzi I determined that Sam had given Felipe (another paparazzi) one of Britney's cars to get her out of the house when he heard that Jamie and I were on our way to see Britney. I also understood from the conversation that Sam disabled all of Britney's cars (she has several at her residence).
- 5. Sam had told Britney that Jamic and I were coming to the house to do an intervention, and that Britney panicked and took off with Felipe. Another man named Chad Hardcastle was in the house.
- 6. I also heard during the evening that during Britney's and Sam's fight that evening, Sam had told Britney that she was an unfit mother, a piece of trash and a whore, that she cares

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27 28 more about Adnah, her current boyfriend, than she cares about her kids, and that she does not deserve her kids.

- 7. The paparazzi reported to Sam and addressed him with great respect. They treated him like a general. He instructed them to get her back to the house. They later told Sam that Britney was on her way back.
- 8. Britney then came back to the house with Adnan, who is also a paparazzi. Sam then told Jackie and me that we needed to do whatever he tells us. I objected. He then told me, "I'm the one who spends 24/7 with your daughter. I sleep in cars outside her house so she can't leave." Sam then said, "You people throw everyone under the bus, if you don't listen to me I'm going to make your name sh\*\* in the papers."
- 9. As I looked around the kitchen, I noticed that in the middle of the kitchen table there was a large car battery. At some point during the evening I learned that the car battery was there so Sam could charge his cell phone. Although Britney has several cell phones, he told us that he had disposed of all of the phone chargers and had made the house phones unworkable.
- 10. Sam told Jackie and me to tell Adnan to leave Britney alone and to get the F\*\*\* out of the house. Jackie refused. Sam then said to tell Britney that Adnan is gay. Adnan stayed at the house a little while longer. Sam quietly said something to Adnan and Adnan promptly left the house.
- 11. Britney came into the room looking for Adnan. Sam told her that Adnan was in the bathroom. Britney then asked me, "Is Adnan gay?" While Britney was out of earshot, Sam told Jackie and me that we should pretend that Adnan was in the bathroom so Britney wouldn't leave.
- 12. Britney then became very agitated and could not stop moving. She cleaned the house. She changed her clothes many times. She also changed her three dogs' clothes many times. Britney spoke to me in a tone and with the level of understanding of a very young girl. Britney then picked up a bottle of pills and read part of the label and asked us, "What does insomnia mean?" Sam told her that the pills will help her stay awake.

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- 13. Sam told Jackie and me that he grinds up Britney's pills, which were on the counter and included Risperdol and Scroquel. He told us that he puts them in her food and that that was the reason she had been quiet for the last three days (she had been sleeping). He told us that the doctor who is treating her now is trying to get her into a sleep-induced come so that they could then give her drugs to heal her brain.
- Sam then encouraged us to sit down on a sofa and to do "requila shots." Jackie 14. and I said we did not want to. Britney seemed to follow our lead. Sam then got some wine out and said "let's all do toasts with wine," Britney said that she didn't want to, she wanted a protty glass. Sam found a glass with a stem and poured wine for Britney when we were not looking. Britney refused to drink her wine and asked to drink mine.
- Shortly afterward, Sam went back into the kitchen and was standing behind a 15. raised but so that we could not see what his hands were doing on the counter. From what I could see, it looked like he was crushing something on the counter. Sam then said to Britney, "Let's go upstairs" and Britney followed him. Britney had calmed down by the time she went upstairs.
- A little while later, Britney came downstairs. She seemed agitated again and told 16. us that she wanted to go to Rite Aid for lipsticks. It was now past midnight. Jackie and I said we would take her. Sam told us that he wanted to follow us in his car. We told him that he shouldn't because the paparazzi were in front of the neighbor's house and would harass us. As we were about to drive off, Sam jumped into the back seat of the car. The paparazzi followed. Sam and I were sitting in the back seat, with Chad as well. He told me that he gave Britney something (when they were upstairs) to make her more light-hearted, happy, and fun. We entered Rite Aid and Britney chose her lipstick. The manager said it is dangerous out there, which it was. When Britney gave the cashier her credit card, the cashier told her it was not working. I paid for the lipstick and the manager told us we could leave through the side door so no one could see us. Sam insisted we leave through the front door and he put his arms around Britney and me for the paparazzi to take pictures. I disengaged as quickly as I could.

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- 17. Sam told me, "You'd better learn that I control everything. I control Howard Grossman, Britney's business manager. I control her attorneys and the security guards at the gate. They don't listen to Britney, they listen to me. That's why Jamje was gone touight."
- At another point that evening, Sam bragged to me that he is the one who receives 18. Britney's cheeks and that one of them was for me. I told Sam that I hadn't gotten any checks from Britney. Sam then told me that they are in his car. He told me that if he weren't in the house to give Britney her medicine, she would kill herself. Then he said to me, "If you try to get rid of me, she'll be dead and I'll piss on her grave."
- He then proclaimed that he has been in the family for a year and that he has done 19. nothing but good for Britney. At this point it was two or three in the morning. Britney was meandering around the house. She would let me hug her, but she was out of it.
- 20. At one point during the night, Sam was screaming at me and Britney said to me, "Sam treats me like that." Then she picked up the house phone and said, "Look at the phone, it doesn't work." Sam then blamed the dead phone on Britney. Jackie spoke up and said to Sam, "You said you cut the phone wire."
- Britney then said again at some point during the night, "When do I get to see my 21. babies?" Sam answered, "Wednesday." Britney then said, "What do I have to do to see them?" Sam responded, "Take the pills I tell you to take," Britney said, "I don't like the pills and I don't like the psychiatrist. Can't I see another psychiatrist so I can see my babies?" Sam responded. "If I told you to take 10 pills a day, you should do what I tell you to see your babies." Jackie then said, "Britney, your parents can help you find a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist needs to get to know you to give you the right medicine," Sam then raised his voice and said, "Why don't you get back with Kevin."
  - 22. Britney then said, "I'll do anything to get them back."
- 23. At some point during the evening, Sam said that Britney decided that he should be her manager.
- Adnah has called me and told me he's worried about Britney. He told me that 24. Sam hides the phones and tells her he has lost them. He also hides her dog, London. She looks

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for him all over the house crying and then Sam brings out the dog from the hiding place and acts like her savior. 25. While we were at Rite Aid, Britney went in and out of her British accent, 26. At 4:00 a.m., I was exhausted and wanted to leave. Sam blocked my car so I could not leave. I threatened to call Jamie to the house. 27. Britney said, "I want my Daddy up here. I want to talk to my Daddy," I reached Jamie on the phone and gave the phone to Britney. I heard her tell him that she wanted to see him, He said, "Right now baby?" and she said, "No." He said, "10:00 in the morning?" And she said, "No, noon." I spent the rest of the night at Britney's house and for the first time in a very long 28. time, when I lay down to sleep, I felt very agitated. I could not fall asleep at all. I felt like I had had coffee. Jackie, who had gone home earlier, later told me that she also could not sleep at all and felt like she had had coffee. Jamie came to pick me up the next morning. Jamie gave Britney a big hug and 29. said to her, "Baby, you're ok?" Britney said, "I'm fine," then burst into tears. 30. To my knowledge, Britney never went to sleep that night and was very agitated most of the night. Sam and Chad, however, slept in the "smoking room," a small room downstairs 31. on the first floor of the house. 32. Later the next day, on January 29, Jackie showed me a text message she had received from Sam: "Thanks for teiling Jamie all your Bull Sh\*t. He just hit me. Now you guys did your deed. Much accomplished. Good job." I did not see Britney again until I arrived at her house on Wednesday night after 33. Sam called me and told me to come to the house. When we arrived, Britney seemed subducd. The police arrived and took her to the Neuro Psychiatric Institute at UCLA ("NPI"). While at 111

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,	NPI, I learned that Britney informed her doctor, Lee Sadja, MD, that she had also taken Aderol.
2	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
3	foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 31, 2008, at Los Angeles, California.
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147 M	DECLARATION OF LYNNE SPEARS

I am an individual over the age of 18 years old. Except where otherwise stated, I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration and, if called as a witness, I could provide competent testimony thereto.

I, Chip MacGregor, declare as follows:

#### Background

- 2. I am the owner, founder, and president of the MacGregor Literary agency, which has represented authors for more than 3 years. I personally have been representing authors for at least the past 13 years. I have secured more than 1,000 book deals for authors with all of the major publisher in both the United States and Canada.
- 3. MacGregor Literary and I have been and continue to be the author's agent for Defendant Lynne Spears ("Lynne") in connection with her sale of her memoir, *Through the Storm*. In that capacity, I am the primary individual responsible for working with her publishers on behalf of Lynne.

#### Disappointing Sales of Through the Storm

- 4. Through the Storm was released to the public on or about September 16, 2008. The attached royalty statement (discussed below) shows publication dates at the end of August of 2008 because the book is first printed several weeks before being released to the public in order that the books may be shipped to retailers in advance of the publication date. Nevertheless, in terms of the public's ability to purchase and read the book, the book was not available for sale until on or about September 16, 2008.
- 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the most recent Royalty Statement (as of March 31, 2009) from the book's publisher, Thomas Nelson, Inc. (redacted to remove irrelevant and private financial information). These royalty statements are generated by Thomas Nelson, Inc. in the ordinary course of business and are received and retained by my agency in the ordinary course of business.
- 6. As reflected on Exhibit 1, the Gross Units reflects the number of books that were printed. As you will see, the royalty statement reflects that more than 165,000 copies of the book

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were printed. We had hopes that the book would not only sell that number of copies but would, in fact, go into additional printings.

7. However, as reflected in the "Net Units," sales of the book have been less than we had hoped. The "Net Units" reflects that as of March 31, 2009, less than 65,000 copies of the book were sold.

Executed under penalty of perjury of the Laws of the United States and the State of California, on this 15th day of June, 2009 in Hillsboro, Oregon.

Chip MacGegor